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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY
INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST;
LaRUE FISHER, individually;
LaRUE FISHER, Settlor and
Trustee of The George Fisher,
Jr. Family Inter Vivos
Revocable Trust Agreement; and
BRENT ELMER FISHER, Co-Trustee
of The George Fisher, Jr.
Family Inter Vivos Revocable
Trust Agreement,

Case No. 940577-CA
Priority Rule 29(b)(15)

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
MAX GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE
FISHER,
Defendants and
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
All the parties to this action are residents of
Duchesne County, Utah.

The action seeks enforcement of an Escrow

Agreement concerning real property in Duchesne County.

The case

was tried to the Court, Judge A. Lynn Payne presiding, without a
jury.

The

plaintiffs

are Appellants

Appellees and also Cross-Appellants.

and

the

defendants

are

Neither side objected to

reference of the appeal to the Court of Appeals and the reference
was made on February 3, 1995.

-2STATEMENT OF ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
1.

Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an

oral agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments due
under the Escrow Agreement?
2.

Was Appellant LaRue Fisher, wife of deceased

George Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.?
3.

Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it

void because of the statute of frauds?
4.

Was a payment for cattle sold in 1979 properly

allowed by the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of
property?
5.

Was the remedy of forfeiture as sought by the

Appellants inequitable under the facts before the Court?
6.

Should

the

Court

have

allowed

Appellants'

attorney fees?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AS TO THE SEVERAL ISSUES
1.

Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an oral
agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments
due under the Escrow Agreement?
The Court found that an oral agreement was entered into

based on conversations between George Fisher, Jr. and Max Fisher.
Great deference must be accorded to the Findings of the Court
Slattery

requiring a marshalling of the evidence.
857 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993); Mostrong
577

v.

Jackson,

v.

Covey

866 P.2d 573,

(Utah App. 1993); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

"clearly erroneous standard," 7 Utah
The

Court's

finding

that

Bar

George

Journal
Fisher

& Co.,

52(a); a

9, 14, ^ 3a.
and

Max

Fisher

-3contemplated that demand for payment would commence a duty to make
annual payments of $10,000 each should require a different standard
State

of review.

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), holds

that "reasonable suspicion determinations" in the mind of a police
officer

"is

reviewable

non-deferentially

for

correctness,

as

opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for clear error."
We suggest that determining what was in the minds of the Fishers is
a comparable determination.
2.

Was Appellant LaRue Fisher, wife of deceased George
Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.?
The question is whether the husband was the authorized

agent of LaRue Fisher in the making of an Agreement which includes
the issue of the terms of the agreement.

The Court's Findings on

this matter also are entitled to great deference and the evidence
needs to be marshalled.

See the cases cited under Point 1 and the

many other cases cited in 7 Utah Bar Journal
3.

9, 14, % 3a.

Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it void
because of the statute of frauds?
The Court held that the statute of frauds did not apply,

because the agreement did not involve title to the real estate.
This is, in effect, a Conclusion of Law which assumes that the
Findings of Fact as to the agreement are valid.

This Court is to

make that decision without deference to the conclusion of the trial

judge.
184, 186

Hansen

v.

Department

of Financial

(Utah App. 1993); Schurtz

v.

P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Zion's
1319 (Utah 1975); Coombs

v.

Ouzounian,

Institutions,

BMW of

Properties

North
v.

858 P. 2d
America,

Holt,

814

538 P.2d

24 Utah 2d 39, 42-43, 465

-4P.2d 356 (Utah 1970); 7 Utah Bar Journal

9, 21 % CI, describes it

as a "standard of correctness."
4.

Was a payment for cattle sold in 1979 properly allowed by
the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of
property?
This is a Finding of Fact, which is entitled to great

deference.

Appellant

must

marshal

the

evidence

overwhelming evidence against the finding of the Court.
cited under Point 1.

The Slattery,

supra,

and

show

Cases are

case holds that a

finding can be overturned upon a sufficient showing.
5.

Was the remedy of forfeiture as sought by the Appellants
inequitable under the facts before the Court?
The Trial Court held that the Notice of Termination of

Agreement (Ex. P5) was proper in form (R. 249, LI. 20-21), but that
it was premature because of the oral agreement made by George
Fisher, Jr. and Max Fisher (R. 253, Ll. 3-4; R. 257, Ll. 12-13).
The Court also ruled that it would be inequitable to forfeit the
property under the Notice
This becomes

relevant

(R. 257, Ll. 9-15; R. 258, Ll. 3-9).

if this

modifying oral agreement.

Court

holds

that

there was

no

The determination of whether forfeiture

would have been inequitable becomes a discretionary ruling, which
probably would be upheld unless it manifests a clear abuse of
discretion.

Ames v. Maas,

846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah App. 1993) . In

real estate forfeiture actions, the Utah Supreme Court has examined
the facts carefully and in detail to determine whether contracts
calling for a forfeiture should be enforced or whether they are
unreasonable,

unconscionable

Appellate Court.

Johnson

v.

or

Carman,

unfair

as

determined

by

the

572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1977);

-5Carlson
v.

v. Hamilton,

Judd,
6.

8 Utah 2d 272, 275, 332 P.2d 989 (1958);

Peck

7 Utah 2d 420, 428, 327 P.2d 712 (1958) .
Should the Court have allowed Appellants' attorney fees?
This

is

a

matter

of

interpretation

of

the

Escrow

Agreement and is addressed to the discretion of this Court.

If all

the payments were past due, attorney fees should have been awarded
unless equities are against the plaintiff.
law.

This is a conclusion of

See citation under Point 3, also Fullman

v.

Blood,

546 P.2d

606, 610 (Utah 1976) .
STATUTES INVOLVED
The only statute

involved

is the statute of frauds.

Either or both of §§ 25-5-1, 3 or 4, Utah Code Annotated
Amended) are urged as applicable.

(1953, as

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

52(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This was an action for recovery and forfeiture of a 600
acre ranch in Duchesne County, which was sold under an Escrow
Agreement in 1974 by George Fisher, Jr. and Appellant LaRue Fisher
to the Appellees

(Ex. P-l) .

The price was $124,000 with $8,280

down and the balance payable $10,000 per year with interest at five
percent

(5%) .

Because

of

default

in payments,

a

Termination was served in behalf of the Appellants

Notice

of

(Ex. P-5),

following the death of George Fisher, Jr., the husband of LaRue
Fisher.
barred

The Defendants contended they owed only the amounts not
by

the

statute

of

limitations

(Ex.

D-6) .

Following

-6commencement of the action for forfeiture, Appellees pleaded that
they had paid in full, that the statute of limitations barred
payments,

that

Appellants

were

barred

by

reason

of

adverse

possession, laches and estoppel, and that they owed nothing (R.
22) .
Course of Proceeding
The case was tried without a jury.

Defendants moved for

dismissal on the ground that the Notice of Termination did not fix
the amount that was owing (Tr. 368), which matter was taken under
advisement by the Trial Court (Tr. 3 78), and the trial proceeded on
a stipulated basis (Tr. 381) . The Court later ruled that dismissal
was not appropriate (R. 249, Ll. 21-22).

Both sides offered oral

and written evidence in support of their positions. The Court took
the matter under advisement at the conclusion of arguments.
Disposition in Trial Court
Judge Payne gave careful consideration to at least some
of the facts involved in the case and made what he considered was
an equitable disposition of the case.

His lengthy decision does

not distinguish between facts, conclusions of law and decision.
Appellants moved to amend the Judgment, requesting a transcript in
order to compare the testimony with the Judge's decision (R. 275) .
This was denied

(R. 284) .

In a conference telephone call, the

Judge stated that he intended that decision to be final and entered
only a perfunctory ruling (R. 284) as a means of fixing the time
for appeal.

-7Statement of Facts
Simply stated, this is the case before the Court:

In

1974 George and LaRue Fisher entered into the Escrow Agreement (Ex.
P-l) with their son Max and his wife Joyce.
sale

of

600

acres of

land

in Duchesne

It provided for the

County

at

a price

of

$124,000, giving credit for $8,250 of work previously done, and
calling for payments of $10,000 per year at five percent

(5%)

interest.

into

The

Appellees, who

were

the

Buyers,

entered

possession and occupied the property, farmed it, ranched it, and
lived on it until the death of the father, George Fisher, Jr., in
1992.

Appellant, the surviving wife, employed counsel, seeking

performance of the contract, taking the position that no payments
had been made. After conferring with the Defendants (Tr. 424, 612613) , a Notice terminating the agreement (Ex. P-5) was served on
them.

By response the Defendants offered $57,100 in full payment

(Ex. D-6), which was not satisfactory to Appellants, and this
action was instituted.

Defendants defended on the grounds of the

statute of limitations, adverse possession, laches, estoppel, and
payment having been made in full (R. 22) .
Facts as to Each Issue
1.

Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an oral

agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments due under
the Escrow Agreement?
Defendants did not plead or argue that an oral agreement
was made between George Fisher in behalf of the Appellants and Max
Fisher in behalf of the Appellees that payments did not have to be

-8made until there was a demand for payments.

This solution was

determined by the Court as a means of avoiding a decision on the
statute of limitations and also as a means of avoiding a burden on
the Defendants of either forfeiture of the property or a judicial
sale for the amount owing, including interest.
In

order

to

point

out

the

fallacy

of

the

Court's

Decision, including both Findings and Conclusions creating the
agreement, Appellants moved to alter or amend the Judgment to be
based upon a transcript of the testimony (R. 275-283).

The Court

denied this (R. 284) , resulting in the appeal and the obtaining of
the transcript of testimony.
Appellants concede that no written demand was made for
any of the payments by George Fisher and that George Fisher talked
to Max Fisher about the payments. Appellants challenge the Court's
Decision that there was an oral agreement as to "when he should
begin making payments" (R. 251, L. 22) , or that "payments" were
delayed

(R. 252,

L.

installment payments"

7 ) , or

that

Max

was

to

"invest

yearly

(R. 252, L. 11), and that Max "could not

afford yearly payments" (R. 252, L. 19) . The Court also noted that
no demand was ever made "that yearly payments begin" (R. 252, L.
25) and that "yearly payments were not due until May 1, 19 93" (R.
253, L. 4 ) .
Marshalling of the evidence is appropriate to determine
just what the testimony of Max Fisher was as to his conversations
concerning payments as they became due. Max Fisher testified as to
several conversations with his father as follows:

-9In a conversation in 1974, Max asked George what he
wanted him to do about the payments.

George said, "You go ahead

and put it into the place," . . . "If you got the money to pay this,
put it into this place" and "When I want that place payment, I will
ask you for that place payment. ... That place payment will not do
me no good because of taxes" (Tr. 395, LI. 1, 6, 8-9, 14-16).
As to the payment in 1979, see Point 4.
In about 1988 there was a conversation about rebuilding
the deteriorated home on the place.

Max was asked by Mr. Kunz,

"Did he actually say you would not be pressed to make payments?"
Answer:

"No, he didn't actually say that I wouldn't be pressed to

it, but he says, 'Don't worry about it.'
build the new home.'"

He says, 'Go ahead and

... " No, he never told me not to worry

about it and he didn't tell me he relieved me of ..." (Tr. 419, Ll.
11-19)
Appellee

Joyce

Fisher

testified

that

she

had

no

conversations with the Appellants about payments but that Max
Fisher told her about the conversation in 1975.

She was asked:

"Did you have any concern about the payments thereafter?"
she said she did.

to which

When asked what she did about it, she said, "I

would ask Max to have this taken--I'd ask him to do something with
his dad.

I said, 'Have him put something on paper, do something.'"

"... And I asked him this over 20 years."

(Tr. 477, Ll. 1-14)

Plaintiffs submit that there is no testimony that George
Fisher and Defendant Max Fisher ever discussed having the payments
commence on an annual basis at a later time.

The Decision of the

-10Trial Court admits this and substitutes the opinion of the Court
for testimony by this paragraph of the Decision:
The parties never specifically addressed
the issue as to whether all payments would
become due when George requested payments to
commence.
In view of the fact that the
financial condition of Max and George would
not have allowed them to pay all of the
accumulated payments at one time (which George
was aware of) , and in view of the fact that
George said that when he wanted payments he
would ask for them, the Court finds that the
agreement between Max and George to amend the
contract did not contemplate that all prior
payments become due immediately upon the
request of the Sellers. It was contemplated
and agreed that payments would be delayed and
commenced again when George requested them.
(R. 257, LI. 15-20)
Appellants

submit

that

on

the

issue

of

commencing

payments on an annual basis when a demand is made, there is no
support in the testimony.
without support.

If that is a Finding of Fact, it is

If it is a Conclusion of Law, there is no Finding

of Fact or evidence to support it and it should be rejected.
In this case neither of the parties pleaded or argued for
the disposition made by the Court.
the result to the pleadings.
Redevelopment

Agency

of Salt

It would be reasonable to limit

50 West

Lake City,

Broadway

Associates

v.

The

et al. , 784 P. 2d 1162, 1172

(Utah 1989), where the Court observed:
However, that formula is not in the
contract and neither party argued for it in
the trial court. It is simply the result the
trial court apparently deemed "equitable."
Nevertheless, it is the contract that
governs this dispute.
In truth, the trial
court reached a compromise solution which it
worked out on its own, apart from the contract
language.
The
result
may be
a
fair

-11compromise, but it is not what the contract
calls for.
In Colman

v.

Colman,

743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987),

this Court held that the decision of the trial court should be in
accordance with the pleadings unless the parties have tried the
case as though that were an issue and as though the pleadings had
been amended to include that issue, saying:
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that
issues tried by express or implied consent
shall be treated as if raised in the
pleadings. ... If a theory of recovery is
fully tried by the parties, the court may base
its decision on that theory and deem the
pleadings amended, even if the theory was not
originally pleaded or set forth in the
pleadings or the pretrial order. M.B.I.
Motor
Company v. Lotus East,
506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th
Cir. 1974). However, that the issue has, in
fact, been tried, and that this procedure has
been authorized by express or implied consent
of the parties must be evident from the
record.
Contrary

to

what

the

Judge

speculated

was

in

the

contemplation of the parties, there was testimony as to what was
actually in the mind of George Fisher, Jr. when he did not insist
on the payments being made as they fell due.

Plaintiff LaRue

Fisher was asked if she ever talked to George about the payments on
the contract.

She answered that she had and said:

"I've talked to him quite often. And he just
didn't want trouble in the family and he just-he wanted to do it, but he kept saying, 'Max
will be the loser.' And that's the thing I
got--that's what he used to say 'Max will be
the loser if he doesn't want to come forth in
a lot of it.'" ... "I've been hurt about it.
I've really been hurt." (Tr. 551, LI. 16-24)

-12Kim

M.

Fisher,

a

son

of

George

and

LaRue

Fisher,

testified that he had a conversation with his father George Fisher
at the Chuck-O-Rama in Provo at the end of March 1992 (Tr. 571, Ll.
20-24) , at which Kim Fisher asked his father to take care of the
problem between him and Max and
"My father told me, he says, 'I can't.' He
says, 'I can't take my son off that place.'"
... "I can't take my son off that place.' And
he says, "Max will be the one to lose.' He
says, 'If he doesn't make right with that
place and something happens to me the property
will automatically go back in the trust and
there shouldn't be any problems.' And that's
exactly how dad felt this would be handled."
(Tr. 573, Ll. 1-9)
Susan Fisher Thacker, daughter of George and LaRue Fisher
(Tr. 588, L. 7 ) , also testified to a conversation with her father
after he had said, "Max will be the loser." (Tr. 589, Ll. 23-24).
When asked how Max would be the loser, George Fisher responded,
according to Susan Fisher Thacker,
"He just said that Max would be the loser. He
said the property would all go back in the
estate or Max would have to pay. And so--I
didn't pursue it any further than that with
dad."
(Tr. 591, Ll. 15-18)
Peggy

Fisher, who

is Mrs. Kim Fisher

(Tr. 595, Ll.

23-25), testified to a conversation with her father-in-law George
Fisher, Jr. ,
"He told us that Max was a poor manager and
that he was too lazy to milk the cows. And
that what he and LaRue had built over the
years he had let go. And that he would be the
loser in the end and not to worry about it."
(Tr. 598, Ll. 17-20)

-13There is no evidence that George Fisher, Jr. had in mind
taking no action against his son for family reasons and then after
he was gone let annual payments start and continue until they had
been paid.

The Trial Court found that all the payments were due

plus interest, less the down payment and the payment of $24,980,
which was paid in 1979

(R. 258, Ll. 21-24) .

The Court gave no

figure as to the amount owing.
Following

the

issuance

of

the

Court's

Decision

on

September 30, 1994, Plaintiffs submitted a Response to Defendants'
Objection to Proposed Order and Judgment suggesting that allowing
the 1979 cattle payment of $24,980 as a payment on the contract
would leave a balance of $109,700 and interest on that amount of
$83,109 to 1994 would make a total of $192,809 (R. 263-273 at 266) .
An amortization

schedule based on a theoretical

acceptance of

$20,000 suggested that it would take 41 years at $10,000 a year to
pay that off (R. 26 9, Addenda P. 12).
Actually, those calculations were in error.
owing

on

the

contract

after

the

down

payment

The balance

was

$115,720.

Interest at 5% on that amount from May 1, 1974 to May 1, 1979 would
be $28,930 or a total of $144,650. Crediting $24,980 to that would
leave $119,670 as the balance owing on May 2, 1979, representing
$115,720 of principal and $3,950 of interest.
Interest at 5% per annum on $115,720 for 15 years to
May 1,

1994

would

be

$86,790

plus

the

$3,950

of

carry-over

interest, being the amount over principal on May 2, 1979, making a
total of $206,460.

If judgment were entered on that amount at 5%

-14per annum, it obviously would never pay off.

That appears to be

what Plaintiffs are entitled to under the Trial Judge's Decision.
If, for some reason, it should be held that Defendants
are able to pay the interest off without a judgment and without
compounding interest, it would take nine years to pay off the
$90,740 of interest.
per year.

Interest on $115,720 at 5% would be $5,785

A payment of $10,000 would therefore reduce the $90,740

of accumulated interest by $4,215 per year and would require 21-1/2
years to pay it off.
year and

Amortization of the $115,720 at $10,000 per

5% interest would require

18 years according

to the

schedule at Addenda p. 14, or a total of 3 9-1/2 years.
In addition to that, dollars are becoming less valuable
because of inflation.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics

Consumer Price Index, the inflation went from an index of 49.3 in
1974 to 144.5 in 1994 (Addenda P. 15).

This was supplied to the

Trial Judge (R. 220-222) . That is an inflation rate of 193%. This
means

that

payment

now

is much

less

in real

value

than was

contemplated, without looking at inflation over the next 39-1/2
years.
The logical relief would be a judgment of $206,460 at
judgment interest of 5% or more; and at $10,000 per year, it would
never pay off.
To suggest that George Fisher, Jr. or even Max Fisher had
in mind any such unreasonable result for paying for the ranch is
completely unrealistic.

-152.

Was Appellant LaRue Fishery wife of deceased George

Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.?
There was no testimony that Appellant LaRue Fisher agreed
to postpone
challenge

any of the

this,

as

annual payments.

shown

by

the

The Court

following

does not

statement

in

the

Decision:
The Court is convinced that the agreement
and modification were each negotiated entirely
between George and Max.
Where there was
disagreement, LaRue acquiesced to the will of
George.
This is seen in their disagreement
over the payments. LaRue clearly wanted the
payments to be made.
She discussed this
subject often with George but could not get
him to take action.
Instead of taking
independent action, she submitted to his will.
(R. 254, LI. 21-24)
Although

the

Court

recognized

that

this

litigation

involves a family problem, both as between George Fisher and his
wife, the Appellant LaRue Fisher, and also as between father and
son, rather than hold that the failure to take positive action by
the parents was because of the family relationship, the Court ruled
that George Fisher agreed not to require payments.

The Court also

recognized that George Fisher and his wife did not have the same
views on this (R. 254, supra)

. The Court held that LaRue was bound

by the "agreement" made by George without mentioning her.

At page

7 of his Decision, the Court discusses this matter but concludes
that LaRue "is also bound by the agreement to postpone payments
(R. 255, LI. 21-22).
The evidence is plain that Appellant LaRue Fisher did not
acquiesce in not requiring the payments and that this was known to

-16the

family

as

having

created

a difficult

situation,

hereafter be shown by reference to the evidence.

as

will

It is plain that

unwillingness to rock the marital boat was the reason she did not
take a positive stand against the Defendants by insisting upon the
payments.
LaRue Fisher testified that prior to George's death, she
demanded twice that Appellees make payments that were due (Tr. 33 9,
L. 20). The first time was prior to the building of the new home
on the

ranch, when

she and her husband George

called

on the

Appellees and "George said, 'We've come down to see if we could get
started on these payments.'
said,

'We have paid.'

And Joyce said, 'What payments?'

And he said,

'Go get

She

the receipts.'"

(Tr. 354, LI. 4-10 and 20-25)
The second time was at a cemetery when Max and Joyce
Fisher were sitting in their car, which was about five or six years
ago (Tr. 360, Ll. 8-10), when LaRue Fisher said, "I think it's time
now that we're getting busy on payments.

And Max looked at me and

'ha ha' now this is what he done." (Tr. 359, Ll. 9-13).

Both Max

and Joyce Fisher denied that these conversations took place, but
LaRue Fisher's attitude was testified to by other persons.
James J. Oman testified that he was well acquainted with
all the parties and when asked about payments testified,
"Well, it was discussed at least twice while
we were--when we were making our visits with
George and LaRue. And it was brought up that
Max hadn't made any payments. And LaRue said,
' I think we should push that and get the
payments, plus interest on the payments.' ...
And George said, 'I don't think we should
charge interest on it.'" When asked if George

-17indicated that he wanted to force Max into
making payments, Mr. Oman answered, "No." (Tr.
526, Ll. 14-25)
When Mr. Oman was asked if "this was a sore spot between George and
LaRue," he answered, "There was no doubt about it.
528, L. 24)

It was." (Tr.

When asked about his impression of the attitude

between George Fisher and LaRue Fisher, Mr. Oman testified,
"He didn't say anything about the debt. The
only thing I heard him say was--LaRue says we
should have the full payment, plus interest,
and George says, 'I don't think we should
charge interest.'" (Tr. 528, Ll. 14-17)
"Well, just that he sort of shrugged it off.
He liked, as the testimony has been given, he
liked to tease LaRue about it and she would
kind of get upset and maybe a little annoyed
at George for doing that. But he would just
kind of--well, I don't know whether these was
his exact words, but he kind of said, 'Let it
go.'" (Tr. 531, Ll. 14-19)
Phillip J. Timothy, who testified that he is a cousin of
Max

Fisher

(Tr.

516, L.

21), testified

that

he

didn't

feel

comfortable getting involved in the middle of this problem (Tr.
517, Ll. 17-19)

He testified that at a family reunion two or three

years ago he had a conversation with George Fisher and his wife
LaRue and Timothy's wife, and he testified:
"And I don't know how it came up for sure.
Something came up about the ranch, the money
that was owed on the ranch and Max had owed
some money and not paid. And LaRue was quite
upset. She got upset. George was a tease and
he laughed and joked a little bit about it,
but never joked but kind of sluffed it off-you know--George was a joker." (Tr. 519, Ll.
18-24)
Then he went on to testify:

-1811

She said she felt that the debt should be
paid in full and that he should pay interest
and he should pay everything in full and he
had not done so and was quite upset over it.
And that he had not done this.
And then I
didn't know anything about it. And George he
just kind of turned sideways in his chair, I
can remember, and he said, "LaRue, let's just
not talk about it. Let's not get into it."
He says, "I don't want to get into it
tonight." Something to that effect. And he
says, "I know that there's been other things
given to the other kids that is almost as much
as this is." (Tr. 520, Ll. 2-12)
Max also testified that the relationship between him and
his mother and between his wife Joyce and his motner LaRue Fisher
was not good

(Tr. 431; 432; 433; 434; 460-461; 611, Ll. 5-19).

LaRue Fisher testified to the same difficulty (Tr. 550-552) . Oman
also so testified (Tr. 528, Ll. 1-8).
3.

Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it void

because of the statute of frauds?
There was no written evidence from either side touching
on the question of postponing the annual payments.
Appellants filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Reply
and the Answer to the Counterclaim (R. 176) and filed the Amended
Reply and Answer (R. 180), which was approved (R. 184). This was
for the purpose of pleading the statute of frauds, Utah
Annotated

Code

§§ 25-5-1, 3 and 4, arguing that this barred conver-

sations between Max Fisher and George Fisher in the absence of
Appellant

LaRue

Fisher and was a defense

estoppel.

The Memorandum cited Coombs v.

465 P.2d 356 (R. Ill),

as to the

Ouzounian,

issue of

24 Utah 2d 39,

arguing that that case holds that estoppel

was not available unless the relying party had gone to the other

joint tenant seeking approval or disapproval of the oral agreement
(R. 177) .

The Trial Court held that this case did not apply

because the statute of frauds applied only to a change of title to
the

property

(R.

389, Ll.

15-23,

R.

390-391),

so

the

Court

permitted testimony of Max Fisher as to conversations with his now
deceased father.

The Court in its decision ruled that the statute

of frauds did not apply to the modification of the oral agreement
which was at issue in this case (R. 257, Ll. 24-25 to R. 258, Ll.
1-2) and didn't consider the issue of estoppel.
Appellee Joyce Fisher recognized the uncertainty of oral
statements and testified that for 20 years she had tried to get
Max,

her husband,

to have

reduced

Fisher, Jr. was willing to concede.

to writing whatever

George

She said she had concern about

the payments and when asked what she did about it, she said,
"I would ask Max to have this taken--I'd ask
him to do something with his dad.
I said,
'Have him put something on paper.
Do
something.' And he'd just tell me, 'No, don't
worry about it.
Dad's taking care of it.'
And I asked him over 2 0 years." (Tr. 4 77, Ll.
3-14)
Following the conversation about building the home on the
ranch

and

overhearing

a

conversation

between

George

concerning the payments, Joyce Fisher testified,
"I was after him more. I said, 'You need to
get with your dad and get this settled. Get
it on paper. Get something. Anything.' Max
said, 'Don't worry about it, dad's got it
taken care of.'" She was asked if she then
quit worrying about it and she answered, "That
was my answer for 15 years or whatever we was
there."

and

Max

-20She testified that there was nothing in writing to change the
original agreement.
4.

(Tr. 486-487)

Was a payment

for cattle sold

in 1979 properly

allowed by the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of
property?
The Notice of Termination
Complaint of the Appellants

(Ex. P-5)

followed by the

(R. 1-12) took the position that no

payments had been made on the contract other than the down payment.
Defendants contended that a check in payment of cattle sold in 1979
was given to the decedent
contract.

George

Fisher as a payment

on the

Plaintiffs contended that the cattle sold belonged to

George and LaRue Fisher and was not a payment on the contract.
Max Fisher testified that in 1979 he told his father he
had sold milk cows and wanted him to take the money, and George
Fisher said he didn't want it (Tr. 402, Ll. 7-18) , and Max insisted
that

he

take

one

of

the

checks, which

was

the

smaller

one

identified on Ex. D-7 in the amount of $24,980 (Tr. 89 and 90) . He
further testified that these were his cows and not George Fisher's
cows (Tr. 406) and that he hauled the cattle to the point of sale
and had the check made payable to his folks (Tr. 4 07, Ll. 2-6) . He
also testified that he had the check made out to his father because
he

didn't

want

any

trouble

with

income

tax

(Tr. 447).

The

Defendants' record of cattle sales (Ex. P-8) shows sales of cattle
in 1979 totaling $21,007.75 and does not show any sale of $24,980
or $58,000 (Tr. 451 and Ex. P-8) . There is nothing that shows they
were the cattle of Max Fisher and they were "handled and disposed

-21of as if they were his

[George Fisher's] cattle and handled as

though he was the owner" (Tr. 4 52).
Joyce Fisher testified that Max sold cattle in 1979 and
got $58,000

(Tr. 480) and also $24,000 and that the cows were

theirs and not George's.

She testified that she kept the record of

sales of cows which is Exhibit P-8 and that the record does not
show any sale of $58,000 but does show a number of sales totaling
$21,000 something (Tr. 490).

She doesn't know why the record of

the other cattle sales were not in that book (Tr. 490, L. 21) .

In

1979 she and Max sold more than $100,000 worth of cattle (Tr. 491,
L. 16) . She examined the 1979 tax return of her and Max Fisher and
doesn't know why the $24,980 does not appear in the return.

The

figure $45,000 on the tax return doesn't match either the $24,980
or the $58,000 (Tr. 492).
Joyce Fisher also testified that the $58,000 and $21,000
were reported to their accountant (Tr. 493), but she doesn't know
whether "the money that went directly to George was reported as
your income" (Tr. 493-494; also Tr. 495, Ll. 5-13).
Plaintiff LaRue Fisher testified that she kept a journal
of income and expenses (Tr. 545, Ll. 9-19), five pages from vv.iich
were marked as Exhibit P-12

(Tr. 546) .

The exhibit shows that

sales of cattle in 1979 were $24,986 (?) for 26 head of Holstein
cows (Tr. 548, Ll. 15-17).

These were some of the cattle left on

the place in 1974 and that figure was reported to IRS (Tr. 54 9, Ll.
1-7; also Tr. 545, Ll. 10-14).

LaRue Fisher also testified that

Exhibit P-12 shows income in 1973 of $61,363.82, that Max's share

-22was $10,698.75, and that this was milk income based on their cattle
and also on Max's cattle (Tr. 547) . She testified that of the cows
left on the farm for Max to milk in 1974, she thought 113 cows were
left and there were at least 70 or 80 that belonged to George and
her

(Tr. 557, Ll. 12-14) .

She knows that in 1974 her husband

George was milking 113 head of cows (Tr. 559, Ll. 16-18) . She also
testified

that

the $61,000 of milk

income

in 1973 was before

expenses and the $10,000 paid to Max was clear, not subject to any
payment of expenses (Tr. 562); the number of cows was between 70
and 8 0 that belonged to her and George, and 113 was the total that
George was milking in 1974 (Tr. 563) . The 113 cows is a number she
definitely remembers (Tr. 564) and the number of 70 to 80 is the
approximate number of cows that she and George owned at the time of
sale (Tr. 564). Max testified that George and LaRue didn't leave
that many cows on the place (Tr. 608).
5.

Was

the

remedy

of

forfeiture

as

sought

by

the

Appellants inequitable under the facts before the Court?
The

Court

found

it

would

be

inequitable

to

order

forfeiture of the property because the Appellants would receive the
new home on the property
Defendants

would be

"free of any encumbrance" while the

liable

for the pledge

of

the

cattle

and

equipment in the amount of approximately $30,000 (R. 252, Ll. 1618) . In addition, the Court found that other buildings were built,
sprinkling systems were installed, the land was cleared and graded,
ponds were constructed and expanded, and the property was improved

-23substantially with monies which could otherwise have been paid on
the contract (R. 257, Ll. 6-10).
In determining whether forfeiture would be inequitable,
the Court must take into account the pluses as well as the minuses.
In Carlson

v.

Hamilton,

8 Utah 2d 272, 275, 332 P.2d 989 (1958),

the purchasers sued to recover payments made on a real estate
purchase after default of the payments and forfeiture of the land
and the money which the purchaser had paid.
judgment for the purchaser plaintiff.

The Trial Court gave

The Supreme Court reviewed

the facts carefully, including the purchase price, the amount paid,
the value of occupancy for two years, the cost of reselling the
property, and reversed the Trial Court, saying that the courts will
enforce contracts of this kind unless enforcement would be "so
unconscionable that no decent, fair minded person would view the
ensuing result without being possessed of a profound sense of
injustice ... . " and found no such situation in that case, quoting
Peck

v.

Judd,

7 Utah 2d 420, 428, 326 P.2d 712, 717 (1958).

In Peck

v.

Judd

there was an action by the vendor for

forfeiture of property due to default, and restitution was granted.
The Supreme Court examined all the facts carefully and confirmed
the restitution, concluding:
Courts of equity should not interfere
except
when
sharp
practice
or
most
unconscionable results are to be prevented.
See also Soffe

v. Ridd,

659 P. 2d 1082 (Utah 1983) ; Morris

624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); Gavin

v.

Johnson,

v.

Sykes,

131 Conn. 489, 41

-24A.2d 113, 156 ALR 1130, 1137.

The cases show the great latitude

the reviewing court has in determining what is equitable.
The benefits that the Defendant Appellees had received
from the property were very substantial.

They had occupied the

ranch property as their home and paid no rent for 2 0 years.
had

farmed

and

ranched

the

property

and

that

is

why

They
the

improvements as to buildings and sprinkling system were made. They
had raised cattle on the property as evidenced by the records of
sales of cattle (Ex. P-8) , including a substantial sale in 1980 for
a bad check, which was lost, but which was not the fault of the
Plaintiffs or George Fisher (Tr. 430, 435, 436) . They had received
$30,000 from the Mapco contract (Tr. 458) and $12,500 in 1985 on
the Linmar contract, which is Exhibit P-9, plus $1,000 a year from
1985 to the time of trial (Tr. 458, 459 and 469) .
6.

Should the Court have allowed Appellants' attorney

fees?
The Escrow Agreement (Ex. P-l) in provision V(c) in the
last paragraph provides:
If any suit or action is brought to enforce
any of the covenants herein contained, the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses
of
such
action,
including
a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Said Agreement on page 1 provides that the Buyers will pay $10,000
on the 1st day of May, 1975, and a like sum on each May thereafter
until paid in full, with interest at five percent (5%).
The Trial Court ruled that the parties had entered into
an oral agreement modifying this provision as to payments (R. 251-

-25251 m

11, 12, 13), but there is no evidence of any oral discussion

modifying attorney's fees.
The Court ruled that

"Plaintiff having failed on its

Complaint is not entitled to attorneys fees."

(R. 257, Ll. 21-22)

The Court did not dismiss the Complaint and in effect
gave judgment for $115,720 of principal and $90,740 of interest or
a total of $206,460.
awarded

to

the

On that basis, attorney's fees should be

Plaintiffs

as

the

prevailing

parties.

The

postponement of payments is based on what the Court found to be an
oral agreement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an oral
agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments due under
the Escrow Agreement?

The Court finds forfeiture of the ranch

property to be inequitable and fashions as an alternative an oral
agreement made between father and son that payments would not have
to be made as they fell due and that at some future time, the
father would demand payments, which would start a series of annual
payments of $10,000 each at five percent (5%) interest until the
total amount due would be paid, which amount with interest is
$206,460.

Such an agreement was not pleaded, was not testified to,

and was not argued by either side, yet the Court found that it was
within the contemplation of the parties.
An
reasonable,

agreement
as

that

to

would

postpone
be

until

similar

to

demanded
a

judicial

would

be

sale

or

foreclosure sale, would protect the Appellees as to value and would

-26give them a short period of time within which to pay off the
balance.

But since the payments were not forgiven and interest was

not forgiven, the result is completely inequitable, as it would
either never be paid off at $10,00 per year or would extend beyond
the life or lives of the parties to the action, and would be
payable in dollars which, according to present trends, would be
substantially deflated, even if somehow the Congress can avoid
national bankruptcy.
Such

an

agreement

contemplation of Max Fisher.

was

clearly

not

within

the

He repeatedly discussed with his

father payments as they were falling due and without waiting for
any demand by his father.

The so-called tender of $57,100 made by

Appellees through their attorney shows their opinion that whatever
was due was then due and owing, and they relied on the statute of
limitations

as barring

all but

original Escrow Agreement.

the

last

six payments

of

the

(See Addenda P. 14)

Such was clearly not within the contemplation of George
Fisher, as explained

to other members of his

family that the

failure of Max to pay would result in loss of the property.
11• Was Appellant LaRue Fisher, wife of deceased George
Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.?

The Court

found that in the family relationship, the husband was allowed to
take the lead in business affairs, despite the fact that Appellant
LaRue Fisher did not approve of the failure of her husband to
enforce

the

terms

of

the

contract.

It

is

plain

that

the

relationship between mother and son and daughter-in-law was not

-27warm and that postponing the payments was not to LaRue Fisher's
liking.

It is admitted that she took no action on her own account

to insist on payments because she was married to George.
Such agency could not reasonably have gone beyond what
LaRue

Fisher

was

aware

of,

namely

that

her

husband

was

not

insisting on strict performance by the Appellee purchasers, even
though they were constantly in default.

There was no notice of any

kind to her that there was any possibility of commencing payments
at a later date in the amount of $10,000 per year, regardless of
how long that payment schedule would be.
Ill. Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it void
because of the statute of frauds?

The issue of the statute of

frauds was raised by the Motion to alter or amend the pleadings and
the filing of the Memorandum urging the statute of frauds and
including the necessity of obtaining the written approval of the
joint tenant even if the negotiating joint tenant was in agreement.
Actually, in our case there was no writing between the father and
son either.
The Court held that the statute of frauds did not apply
to the agreement

to extend the time for payments and that it

applied only where the actual transfer of title was

involved.

Appellants submit that the trial judge ignored cases presented and
argued and that he was in error in ignoring the statute of frauds.
IV. Was a payment

for cattle

sold

in 1979 properly

allowed by the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of
property?

All the documentary evidence before the Court showed

-28that the cattle sold in 1979 belonged to George and LaRue Fisher
and the check did not constitute a payment on the contract.
The agency which purchased the cattle scheduled it as
George Fisher cattle. The record which Appellant LaRue Fisher kept
of sales of their cattle listed this sale as their cattle.

The

record of sales of cattle kept by Appellee Joyce Fisher did not
show this as a sale of cattle but did show other sales in that
year.

The income tax return of Defendants did not schedule this

item as a sale of their cattle and LaRue Fisher testified that it
was reported to their accountant as a sale of their cattle and tax
paid on it accordingly.

Appellant LaRue Fisher testified that they

did have 70 or 80 head of milk cows left on the property for Max to
milk for the time being and that these were some of the cattle sold
in the 1979 sale.
Against

this

testimony

was

the

testimony

of

the

Defendants that the cattle were theirs and they didn't report them
as being their own cattle for income tax reasons, which makes them
out to be income tax evaders.
testimony

was

not

It is submitted that this oral

substantiated,

was

self-serving,

was

not

sufficient to overcome the overwhelming documentary evidence, and
testimony of LaRue Fisher.
V. Was

the

remedy

of

forfeiture

as

sought

Appellants inequitable under the facts before the Court?

by

the

The Court

found that it would be inequitable to permit forfeiture of the land
because in about 1988 or 1989 Appellees had built a new house on
the property in place of the old one, had borrowed $30,000 against

-29cattle and equipment as a means of building the house, which amount
was

still

owing,

and

that

it would

be

inequitable

to

permit

investment of available money in improvements on the property or
for other purposes and then suddenly demand payment.
The Court did not consider or give any weight to the
following factors:
Defendants moved on to the farm in 1974 and made it their
home, the basis of their occupation and their living from then
forward, including substantial sales of cattle.
The farm and ranch produced the income on which they
lived and from which they made improvements on the property, which
improvements made the property more productive and produced further
income and made it more useful to them.
Defendants realized $30,000 from Mapco in 1985, $12,500
from Linmar in 1985, and $1,000 per year from Linmar thereafter,
all from the property itself.
The $30,000 borrowed against cattle and equipment was
borrowed against things which had been purchased or produced by the
property itself as the basis. There was no showing that the cattle
and equipment

do not

still exist and cannot be

liquidated

to

satisfy the $30,000 without touching the real property.
The customary alternative to forfeiture of land is to
give time for payment through requiring notice and a judicial sale
or a foreclosure sale, which was the reasonable alternative in this
case.

-30VI. Should the Court have allowed Appellants'
fees?

attorney

Assuming that the Court was right in its entire decision

except for the matter of attorneys fees, attorneys fees should
still have been awarded as provided in the Escrow Agreement.

After

the Notice of Termination was given and the Appellees had responded
by offering $57,100, Appellants had no alternative except to accept
the

$57,100

or

file

action.

The

action

has

resulted

in

a

determination that a far greater amount was owing and Appellants
have therefore succeeded in the Trial Court and attorneys fees
should have been awarded as provided in the Escrow Agreement.
MOJUMENT
POINT I
DID GEORGE FISHER, JR., NOW DECEASED, MAKE AN
ORAL AGREEMENT WITH APPELLEE MAX FISHER POSTPONING
PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT?
The
nonpayment

Complaint

in accordance

seeks

forfeiture

of

the

property

with the Escrow Agreement.

for

If this

measure is inequitable, the usual alternative is to appraise the
position of each party.

If forfeiture would unreasonably benefit

the vendor or harshly punish the purchaser, then order a plan for
sale of the property with the proceeds over vendor's entitlement
going to the purchaser.

Carlson

332 P.2d 989 (1958); Johnson
1977); Peck
v.

Ridd,

v.

Judd,

v.

v.

Hamilton,

Carman,

572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah

7 Utah 2d 420, 428, 327 P.2d 712 (1958);

659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983); Morris

684 (Utah 1981).

8 Utah 2d 272, 275,

v.

Sykes,

Soffe

624 P.2d 681,

-31This result permits realization of a fair price and if
there is anything left over above what the vendor properly has
coming, it goes to the purchaser.

Whether forfeiture is in fact

inequitable in this case is considered under Point V.

The Trial

Judge did find forfeiture to be inequitable (R. 258, Addenda P. 9,
LI. 6-15)) but fashioned a unique agreement to make it easy on the
purchasers, who are the Appellees.

If the parties did agree on a

substitute, that would be a reasonable outcome.

But here neither

party pleaded, offered evidence, or argued in favor of an agreement
postponing the time of payments and establishing a schedule.
true

that

formal

demand

was

not

made

for

the

It is

payments

and

postponing them is reasonable; but imposing on the Appellant vendor
a never-ending schedule of payments is not only inequitable, but it
was

not

the

oral

agreement

and

was

not

what

either

party

contemplated.
If all the parties had met together and decided that a
payoff over say a five-year period would be satisfactory, that
would be reasonable.

But here a father was dealing with a son

whose livelihood was farming and ranching the land being purchased
and so long as title was retained and the price was generous to the
purchaser, give latitude to the purchaser, who will have to pay for
the property eventually.
payments of principal.

Interest was accruing and so were the
If George Fisher had not died, the whole

story could have been told.
The Trial Court found that the sale of cattle in 1979
resulted in a payment on the contract.

There was then due, with

-32interest, $144,650.

Payment of $24,980 left $15,720 principal and

unpaid interest of $3,950. With no payments until 1994, additional
interest was $86,790 or a total of $206,460.
and 5% interest, that would never pay off.

At $10,000 per year
Not compounding that

huge interest debt would be grossly unfair to the vendors; but even
if that were ordered, it would take 39-1/2 years to pay it off.
There is absolutely no evidence that George Fisher or Max
Fisher ever contemplated any such future for the property or the
family.
Max Fisher testified that in 1975 (Tr. 395) , in 1979 (Tr.
407, 447, 452) and in either 1988 or 1989 (Tr. 419) , he had conversations with his father about the payments that were then due and
testified that the father did not insist on payment and suggested
that the money be put into the property for improvements or to
build the house.

Under the Escrow Agreement

(Ex. 1, Provision

5(c), third paragraph):
The Buyers agree that the Sellers may, at
their option, reenter and take possession of
said premises without legal process as in its
first and former estate, together with all
improvements and additions made by the Buyers
thereon,
and
the
said
additions
and
improvements shall remain with the land and
become the property of the Sellers ... .
The improvements being made were presumably to make the property
more productive, thereby benefitting the Buyers during the 18-year
interest term and benefitting the Sellers only if the Sellers'
ultimate use of the property would prove that the improvements made
were

useful

evidence.

and

valuable,

on

which

there

was

absolutely

no

It is obvious that the conversations dealt only with the

-33then

current

payment

or

the

matter

repeatedly for further consideration.

would

not

have

come

up

Plainly there was no such

agreement in the mind of Max Fisher and his attorney when they
responded to the Notice of Termination by writing their letter to
Paul J. Barton (Ex. D6) . That letter assumes that all payments are
due and that all except those within six years have been barred by
the statute of limitations.

The amortization schedule attached as

Addenda 14 shows that the original principal balance of $115,720
would be paid in 17 payments plus the final payment of $7,100.
1994 only the

last

five plus $7,100 were within the

In

six-year

statute of limitations, of which Exhibit D6 is an acknowledgement
and also an acknowledgement that all payments were past due.
Furthermore, speculation is not necessary as to what
George Fisher, Jr. had in mind in not forcing his son to pay
promptly the payments as they became due.

This was discussed with

Appellant LaRue Fisher (Tr. 551, Ll. 16-24); Kim M. Fisher, a son
of George and LaRue

(Tr. 571, Ll. 20-24); Susan Fisher Thacker,

daughter of George and LaRue Fisher
Fisher,

a

daughter-in-law

(Tr.

(Tr. 588, L. 7) ; and Peggy
595,

Ll.

23-25) .

These

conversations made plain the fact that George Fisher was letting
his son Max Fisher decide whether to make the payments as they came
due or use the money otherwise and ultimately be compelled either
to pay up or lose the property.
Witnesses called by the Defendants testified that George
Fisher was not insisting on immediate payment (James J. Oman, Tr.

-34526, LI. 14-25; Phillip J. Timothy, Tr. 519, Ll. 18-24 and 520, LL.
2-12) .
Appellants have no particular objection to designating
the relief as an agreement to postpone payments as they came due as
the basis for an alternative to forfeiture, and as a substitute to
the usual alternative of ordering a sale of the property; but
forcing Appellants into a never-ending or 39-1/2 year payoff plan
with probable increase of inflation is just not supportable as
being within the contemplation of the parties on the testimony
given.
POINT II
WAS APPELLANT LARUE FISHER,
WIFE OF DECEASED GEORGE FISHER, JR.,
BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE FISHER, IK ?
Under the paragraph numbered 18 in his Decision, the
Trial Judge analyzed the relationship between George and LaRue
Fisher, recognizing that "The relationship between the spouses is
also important."

(R. 254, L. 15, Addenda P. 6)

He then found:

If there was ever a disagreement, George's
opinion predominated.
George was strong
willed and decisive.
It was George who ran
and operated the dairy and the ranch. Prior
to selling the farm, George was the one who
made the business decisions which related to
the farm. (R. 254, Ll. 18-20, Addenda P. 6)
And again:
Where there was disagreement, LaRue acquiesced
to the will of George. This is seen in their
disagreement over the payments. LaRue clearly
wanted the payments to be made. She discussed
this subject often with George but could not
get him to take action.
Instead of taking
independent action, she submitted to his will.
(R. 254, Ll. 22-24, Addenda P. 6)

This

last

sentence

is

significant.

LaRue

could

not

take

independent action without fracturing her relationship with her
husband and the same thing applied to George. Actually, since they
were joint tenants, neither one could bind the other.

Since they

had different views as to what should be done, it was not possible
for either one to make a binding decision for both.
The Court went on to say:
Although her other children knew of her
feelings about the payments, they did not
advise independent action on her part to
collect the debt.
Instead, they worked on
their father to try to get him to change his
mind.
... She also certainly knew that
payments had not been made during the term of
the contract. ... It is very apparent that
George didn't want trouble between he and his
son, and LaRue didn't want trouble between her
and her husband- . . . The Court also believes
that LaRue knew that George had authorized
some kind of delay in the payments. (R. 255,
LI. 1-3, 5-6, 10-11, 12-13, Addenda P. 7)
These findings by the Court are supported by the testimony.

See

Tr. 395, 419, 477, 551, 573, 591, 526, 531, 519-520.
It was therefore plain that LaRue did not agree with
postponement of the payments and if it was known to her other
children and to her husband, it must also have been known to Max
and Joyce, with whom the relationship was not warm (Tr. 431, 432433, 434, 460-461, 550-552, 611).
It is true that LaRue was aware of the fact that payments
were not being made and that George was responsible for the delay.
However, there is not one word of testimony that could indicate to
LaRue Fisher that there was in the making the possibility that when
demand was made, it would not be for the past due payments but

-36would mark the beginning of a completely new schedule of payments
at $10,000 per year and 5% interest on the entire principal plus
unpaid interest.
LaRue Fisher testified that she demanded the payments of
Max on at least two occasions before George passed away (Tr. 354,
LI. 4-10, 20-25; 360, Ll. 8-20; 359, Ll. 9-3). This was denied by
Max Fisher and Joyce Fisher (Tr. 434, 435, 422, 424).

Since the

only other witness to the conversations, namely George Fisher, was
deceased, it seems reasonable that since LaRue Fisher stated the
place and the circumstances of both conversations, her recollection
was reliable and consistent with the other facts and circumstances.
It is important to recognize the fact that LaRue Fisher
was married to George Fisher and keeping the marriage together was
important.

That explains why she did no more than was actually
Shepick

v.

Munson,

597

done to make definite the position of the parties.
Shepick,

44 Utah 131, 137, 138 P. 1169; Godfried

P.2d 885 (Utah 1979); Chandler

v. Jackson,

vs.

714 P.2d 477 (Ariz. App.

1986) .
POINT 1 IT
ASSUMING THAT AN ORAL AGREEMENT WAS MADE,
IS IT VOID BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS?
The Court ruled that the statute of frauds did not apply
because "The modification did not concern any issue dealing with
title to the property.

The modification came after Buyer had

entered into possession and began to perform under the contract.
The modification was limited to the timing of payments only.
did

not

change

the

amount

due.

The

contract

was

It

partially

-37performed, and the defendant relied upon the oral representations."
(R. 257-258, % 23) Appellants submit this is a question of law and
the opinion of the Trial Judge is entitled to no deference.
The Motion to Amend the Reply and answer the Counterclaim
argued

that

the

statute

of

frauds

prevented

any

binding

of

Appellant LaRue Fisher despite the representations of her husband
(R. 173-174) . Actually, the statute of frauds applies also to the
husband's position.

The Memorandum filed with the Court (R. 176-

178) assumed that the Court might find the husband committed by
estoppel but that that would not apply to the wife, who was a joint
tenant, as is the case here, quoting from Coombs v.
Utah 2d 39, 465 P. 2d 365.
Ouzounian

Ouzounian,

The Court had referred to the Coombs

24
v.

case (misspelled in the record) as not being applicable

to the facts of this case.

The Court referred to the

Ouzounian

case in responding to an objection made by Plaintiffs' attorney
that testimony of conversations by Max Fisher with the deceased
were not admissible in the absence of LaRue Fisher because of the
statute of frauds, which the Court discussed and overruled the
objection (Tr. 389-391).
In Coombs v.

Ouzounian,

supra,

a husband and wife, joint

tenants, had entered into an option to purchase their land.
husband had extended the option in writing and alone.

The

The Court

held that under the statute of frauds, the extension was not valid.
In the closing argument counsel for Appellants cited co
the Court Allen v. Kingdon,

723 P.2d 394, 396

(Utah 1986), as

holding that any modification of a material portion of a contract

-38is within the statute of frauds, which the Trial Court rejected
because it didn't apply to our case (Tr. 620-622).
Allen

v.

Kingdon,

723

P.2d

394,

396

(Utah

1986),

included a sale for a house which was modified by an oral agreement
that the vendor would paint the front of the home as a reduction of
the price of sale.

The Court held that this oral agreement was

within the statute of frauds and was void, with this statement:
Nor were the buyers entitled to rescind
the earnest money agreement because of the
sellers' failure to paint the front of the
home as promised. Cf. Thackeray
v. Knight,
57
Utah at 27-28, 192 P. at 266 (buyer's oral
rescission of contract for sale of land was
valid when seller breached contract).
The
rule is well settled in Utah that if the
original agreement is within the statute of
frauds, a subsequent agreement that modifies
any of the material parts of the original must
also satisfy the statute. Golden Key
Realty,
Inc. v. Mantas,
669 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985).
Zion's

Properties

v. Holt,

538 P.2d

1319, 1322

(Utah

1975) , involves an oral agreement to reduce payments until personal
property had been moved from the property, which was held to be
void because it was not in writing.

The Court said:

It is elementary that when a contract is
required
to
be
in
writing,
the
same
requirement applies with equal force to any
alteration or modification thereof.
Appellants submit that the oral conversation which George
Fisher, Jr. had with Max Fisher was a modification of the written
Escrow Agreement and was not binding, because it was not in writing
and signed by the parties.

If it should be held that George Fisher

should be estopped because Max Fisher relied on the oral statement,
that still would not cover the joint tenant LaRue fisher, who made

-39no such statement and from whom no writing was obtained and no
consent was solicited.
POINT IV
WAS A PAYMENT FOR CATTLE SOLD IN 1979
PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE COURT AS A PAYMENT
ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF PROPERTY?
The Trial Court regarded this as a close question and
resolved it on the basis that the recollection of Max Fisher was
clearer than the recollection cf LaRue Fisher (R. 257, Addenda P.
9, LI. 2-4).
The position of Plaintiffs is based upon the documentary
evidence plus the recollection of LaRue Fisher that the sale was of
their cattle and it was so treated, and no question arose as to
whose cattle they were until this lawsuit.

On the other hand, Max

Fisher along with his wife Joyce took the position that the cattle
belonged to them and tried to talk around all the evidence which
was made at the time of the sale, and in none of which was there
any indication that Max and Joyce claimed the cattle to be theirs.
The record of cattle sold kept by LaRue Fisher (Ex. P-12,
P-6) showed a sale of 26 Holstein cattle in 1979 for $24,986 (the
writing

is not

testified

that

very

plain

these were

and
their

could

be

cattle

$24,900

even).

(Tr. 481) .

She

She
also

testified that this sale of cattle was reported to their accountant
as a sale of their cattle and was so reported on their income tax
return (Tr. 493).

On the other hand, the records of cattle sold

kept by Joyce Fisher

(Ex. P-8) showed sales of cattle in 1979

totaling $21,007.75 and did not show any sale of cattle for $24,980

-40or any sale of cattle for $58,000, about which she and her husband
Max testified

(Tr. 480, 403) .

Max testified that the check was

made out to George to avoid income tax questions (Tr. 447). Joyce
Fisher testified that she reported to their accountant cattle sales
of $58,000 and $21,000, but doesn't know whether they reported a
sale of $24,980 (Tr. 493-494, 495).
LaRue Fisher testified that she and her husband left 70
or

80

cows

on

the

farm

for Max

to

milk

and

these

represented the sale of some of them (Tr. 557, 564).

26

head

Max Fisher

testified that George and LaRue left only 12 to 14 head (Tr. 608) .
We submit that the documentary evidence made when there
was no issue between the parties all shows that this was a sale of
George Fisher's cattle.

It is confirmed by the sworn testimony of

LaRue Fisher and we submit that the Defendants have manufactured a
story for selfish reasons and that the overwhelming weight of
authority is against the Trial Court's finding on this issue.
POINT V
WAS THE REMEDY OF FORFEITURE AS
SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS INEQUITABLE
UNDER THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT?
The Trial Court found that an agreement had been made by
George Fisher and Max Fisher in behalf of themselves and their
wives postponing payments on the contract. That occupies the first
part of the Court's ten-page Memorandum Decision (Addenda P. 3-4).
Then, apparently in justification of that holding, the Trial Court
discussed why the Defendants did not want to forfeit the property
and held that it would be inequitable (Addenda P. 4 % 13 and 14).

-41This probably was done to avoid a question on the statute of
limitations (Addenda
trying to be fair.

P. 5, Ll. 1-4) and also to show that he was
He found that the Defendants had built a home

to replace the original one on the property, had borrowed $30,000
to do it, that the annual payments which they could have made had
been invested in the property, and it would now be unfair to make
them dig up the payments (Addenda P. 4 K 13).
The Court did not give any weight to the fact that the
Defendants had occupied the 600 acre ranch and farm for twenty
years, had made their living from it by farming, by milking cows
and by selling cattle, had received $30,000 from Mapco because of
infringement on the property and $12,500 from Linmar plus $1,000 a
year for nine years for use of part of the undesirable portion of
the ranch (Ex. P-9, Tr. 459) , and that they had been able to make
enough money from their operations on the property to invest in
cattle and equipment against which they borrowed $30,000 to rebuild
the house, which cattle and equipment are presumably still theirs
and are removable.

Making improvements on the property would have

made it more productive and would enable them to make more money
from their operations, with no showing that those improvements,
although they pass with the property under the Escrow Agreement,
have substantial value at the present time.
In addition, the Court did not take into account the fact
that the failure of the Defendants to pay had become a sore spot in
family relations.

All the family members, even Max and Joyce,

testified that the relationship between Max and Joyce and Max's

-42mother, LaRue, had become strained, the reason apparently being
that Max resented LaRue's insistence on payment and the other
family members regarded their father, George Fisher, as being too
soft with Max.
All of these factors should have been weighed and should
now be weighed by this Court.

See Carlson

272, 275, 332 P.2d 989 (1958); Peck
327 P.2d 712
Morris

v.

Johnson,

(1958); Soffe

Sykes,

624 P.2d

v.

v.

Ridd,

v.

Judd,

Hamilton,

7 Utah 2d 420, 428,

659 P.2d 1082

681, 684

8 Utah 2d

(Utah 1981);

(Utah 1983);
and Gavin

v.

131 Conn. 489, 41 A.2d 113, 156 ALR 1130, 1137.
If it is inequitable to forfeit the property outright,

the proper alternative, according to those cases, is a provision to
have the property sold, giving the Defendants a chance to buy or to
sell the property and retain anything above what is owed on the
contract.

A case in point is Hale

P. 2d 754.

In that case there had been a default in the payments on

a

real estate

contract

where

v.

Whitlock,

92 N.M. 657, 593

the Court weighed

the equities,

concluded that outright forfeiture would be inequitable, and gave
the purchasers an additional fifteen days after entry of judgment
to pay off the entire contract balance plus interest and attorneys
fees.

The vendor appealed the case, but the case was affirmed.

that case:
The original seller did not object to the
failure to make payments and Appellees were
led to believe that prompt payment of twelve
monthly installments per year would not be
insisted upon. ... Soon after Appellants
purchased the real estate contract from the
original seller, however, Appellants demanded
that Appellees bring their payments up to date

In

by
tendering
$1,675
for
25
delinquent
installments.
Shortly thereafter Appellees
brought this declaratory action.
Appellants contend that the Court erred
in giving Appellees additional time to pay off
the entire contract balance after declaring
the contract to be in default. (Pg. 754)
The Court ruled that:
Under the facts in this case, the trial
court
properly
exercised
its
equity
jurisdiction in granting Appellees additional
time within which to pay off the entire
balance due under the real estate contract
along with interest and attorney fees.
(Pg.
755)
Strict

foreclosure

of

property

under

a

real

estate

contract may be justified rather than the alternative of judicial
sale where the facts support it.

In Vista

Management

vs.

Cooper,

81 Ore.App. 660, 726 P.2d 974, 977, 978 (1986), the purchaser had
paid $5,000 down on a $47,300 contract where the land had increased
in value substantially.
been

negligent

in not

The court found that the purchaser had
keeping

up

its payments

and

therefore

justified strict foreclosure.
The Plaintiffs ask this Court to weigh the equities,
consider the family relationship, consider the impossible payoff if
a

judgment

compounds

interest

and a 39-1/2-year payoff

if no

interest on interest is allowed, coupled with the declining value
of the dollar, and then determine that the result imposed by the
Trial Court was inequitable.

-44POINT VI
SHOULD THE COURT HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS' ATTORNEY FEES?
There can be no doubt that Appellants had to bring this
matter to a head by giving Notice of Termination, since suing for
the payments would have faced the statute of limitations.

The

Court attempted to avoid the issue of the statute of limitations by
devising an oral agreement made between George Fisher and Max
Fisher and then ruled that under that agreement, the payments were
not due until a demand was made and then only one payment was due
and that for that reason the Appellants had failed and were not
entitled to attorneys fees.
Appellants have succeeded in their action because under
the Court's ruling, $115,720 of principal plus $90,740 of interest
is now owing and the Defendants denied that there was anything
owing.

Under the Escrow Agreement, Appellants are entitled to

their attorneys fees to enforce the agreement (Ex. P-l, Provision
V(c) last paragraph).
Following the service of the Notice of Termination, the
Defendants wrote a letter saying they owed $57,100.

After the

filing of the Complaint, Defendants could have tendered $57,100
into

Court

as

the

amount

owing

on the

contract.

Thereupon,

Appellants could have pursued the lawsuit to show that the tender
was

inadequate

entitled

and

could

to attorneys

have

fees.

prevailed

and

would

If Plaintiffs had

have

failed

been

in the

lawsuit, they would probably have had to pay Defendants' attorney
fees.

Instead, Defendants chose to answer and counterclaim their

positions,

all

of which

has

failed,

and

the

Trial

Court

has

conceived an oral agreement of modification, which was not urged by
either party and was not pleaded, and has ruled that Plaintiffs
have failed under the Court's conceived agreement and therefore are
not entitled to attorneys fees.

This is a conclusion of law to be

reviewed by this Court for correctness under the cases cited under
Points I, III and IV.
In Soffe

v. Ridd,

659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah 1983), vendor

sued for possession after default in payments under a uniform real
estate contract, seeking to forfeit all payments made and attorney
fees.

The trial court sustained a counterclaim for return of the

money paid to vendor, less vendor's damage such as interest or
rental value.

The court granted relief as in the counterclaim and

denied attorney fees to vendor.

On appeal the Supreme Court upheld

the relief as in the counterclaim but held that attorney services
were necessary and reversed as to denial of attorney fees, holding:
There is no question in the instant case that
the buyers defaulted and the seller was
warranted in bringing this action to seek
possession and to terminate the contract.
Buyers' default made necessary a determination
of
what
amounts
seller
should
return.
Provisions in written contracts providing for
the
payment
of
attorney's
fees
should
ordinarily
be
honored
by
the
courts.

Management Services

v. Development

Associates,

Utah, 617 P.2d 406 (1900). We think this is
true in the instant case where no compelling
reasons appear otherwise as we found in

Fullman

v. Blood,

supra.
CONCLUSION

The

theory

of

Plaintiffs'

Complaint

was

that

the

Defendants were in default for having failed to make any payments

-46on the contract except the down payment.

The Defendants pleaded

statute of limitations, adverse possession, estoppel, laches, and
payment.

In response the Plaintiffs pleaded the statute of frauds

as making meaningless conversations between Max Fisher and his
father as being both not trustworthy, because self-serving by Max
Fisher, and in violation of the statute of frauds. The position of
the Defendants during the trial was that George Fisher had not
insisted on payments and that the defenses of estoppel and laches
were therefore available in addition to the statute of limitations.
The Trial Court found no evidence of adverse possession,
did find one payment, which the Plaintiffs strongly challenge,
namely the cattle check in 1979 made out to George Fisher, did not
discuss estoppel or laches, found against the Plaintiffs on the
statute of frauds, and then created an agreement not pleaded,
testified to, or argued by either party that an agreement between
father and son somehow bound the wives and made an oral agreement
in the

face of disagreement

by the wife LaRue

Fisher and

in

violation of the statute of frauds.
Our Brief attempts to analyze and disagree with the
Decision of the Trial Court in the way the Court concluded the
matter.

We think the proper disposition should be that the statute

of frauds prevented the making of any binding agreement against the
wishes of the joint tenant LaRue Fisher, who was never approached
by the Defendants as to her position, who was always opposed to the
latitude being given, and who took a firm stand as soon as her
husband has passed away.

-47If this Court upholds ignoring the statute of frauds and
in spite of the lack of pleadings and evidence looks to see whether
an oral agreement was made between George Fisher and Max Fisher,
then we

submit

it

is plain that

there was no agreement

ever

discussed or considered by George Fisher and Max Fisher that at
some future time, when a demand would be made, payments of $10,000
per year would start and all the delay and accumulation of payments
and interest would be ignored.

This result was not the agreement

of the parties, was not the case that was tried, and would result
in a most unreasonable and inequitable long period of payments
beyond the lives of any of the parties, and with cheap dollars as
a constant sore spot between members of the family, of which the
Defendants took advantage for many years because the father could
not bring himself to make an unwilling son live up to his contract.
Appellants urge: First, that the judgment be reversed on
the ground that the statute of frauds prevented any agreement or
any concession by the joint tenant LaRue Fisher.

Second, that the

equities should be addressed and determined by this Court and
either order forfeiture of the property or give a reasonable time
for the Defendants to come up with the money that is owed, followed
by either forfeiture or judicial sale.

Third, this Court should

hold that there is no substantial evidence to support the 1979
cattle sale as being a payment on the contract, all the documentary
evidence showing that the cattle sold belonged to George and LaRue
Fisher.

Fourth, attorneys fees should be allowed to the Appellants

in the Trial Court and in this Court, as they have properly pursued

-48their rights under the Escrow Agreement, with no other reasonable
alternative because of the refusal of Defendants to abide by the
contract.
DATED this 3rd day of March, 1995.

Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C.

Richdrd L. Bird, Jr~ C 7

Lon Rodney Kump 6 ^
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988
Telephone: (801) 328-8 987
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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thereon

to Lohra L. Miller,
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY
INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST;
LaRUE FISHER, individually;
LaRUE FISHER, Settlor and
Trustee of The George Fisher,
Jr. Family Inter Vivos
Revocable Trust Agreement; and
BRENT ELMER FISHER, Co-Trustee
of The George Fisher, Jr.
Family Inter Vivos Revocable
Trust Agreement,

Civil No. 930800065PR
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE

Plaintiffs,
DECISION
vs .
Max GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE
FISHER,
Defendants.
-0O0-

THE COURT: This matter came before the undersigned
for trial on August 24th, 1994. Based upon the evidence, the
Court finds and concludes as follows:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and
subject matter of this action.
2. The Court has now considered the defendant's
motion to dismiss which was made at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case. Based upon the evidence which was then
before the Court and viewing such evidence in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that the plaintiff
did introduce sufficient evidence to prevail as against this
motion. The Court has also reviewed the pleadings and rules
that the pleadings do not raise the issue of whether the
notice was defective for failure to specify a particular
amount due. The escrow agreement does not require the Seller
to set forth a specific amount due in the notice. The
agreement only requires that the escrow agent be notified of
the amount due and then gives the escrow agent an option to
send a copy of this notice to the buyer. The Court rules that
the tender which the defendants made in this matter was
defective. It was defective for two reasons: First, there
was never any showing that the Sellers would have rejected the
money had it actually been tendered and, therefore, there is
no shp^ing that such a tender would have been futile. Second,
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based upon the Court's findings and the conclusions which will
be more fully set forth below, the amount which was tendered
was not sufficient to fully perform the buyer's obligations
under the contract.
3. George and LaRue Fisher (hereinafter George and
LaRue) are husband and wife. Max and Joyce Fisher
(hereinafter Max and Joyce) are husband and wife and Max is
the son of George and LaRue. On or about May 1st, 1994,
George and LaRue (as Sellers) conveyed to Max and Joyce
(as Buyers) approximately 600 acres of land pursuant to a
written escrow agreement (hereinafter contract). The purchase
price was $124,000, and Buyers paid $8,280 as a down payment.
The contract called for yearly annual payments of $10,000
beginning May 1st, 1975. Interest was payable at the annual
rate of 5 percent.
4. Buyers entered into the possession on or about
May 1st, 1974, and have enjoyed possession of the property
through the date of the trial. Buyers entered into possession
by reason of the privileges and rights granted under the
contract. There was no possession which was at any time
adverse to the Sellers. Therefore, the Court concludes that
adverse possession has not been established.
5. The only issue with respect to the Buyers'
obligation under the contract which Lhe Sellers rely upon to
establish a breach of the contract is the payment obligation.
Buyers have entered into the property and performed all other
obligations as required under the contract.
6. The agreement provides that upon default by the
Buyers the Sellers may terminate the contract by serving a 30
day notice upon the Buyers. Upon failure to cure any breach
within 30 days, the interest of the Buyers was to be
terminated and the Buyers' interest in the property was to be
forfeited to the Sellers. The agreement also provides that
the defaulting party pay cost and expenses to enforce the
agreement including a reasonable attorney fee.
7. On or about October 10th, 1975, George and
LaRue signed a trust agreement. The property which was the
subject of the escrow agreement which has been referred to
above was included in land which was quitclaimed to the trust
in order to fund the trust. This quitclaim deed was recorded
with the Duchesne County recorder's office. George and LaRue
were the initial trustees of the trust. Upon the death of
either of the initial trustees, Max and his brother, Brent
Fisher, were to serve as successor trustees together with the
survivor of the original trustees. George died April 18th,
1992, and Max, Brent, and LaRue have served as trustees since
that time.
8. Max was present with his brothers and sister
and parents at a meeting held at an attorney's office where
the trust was discussed. Max was aware of the creation of the
2
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trust and that he was named as a successor trustee. However,
there was no evidence that he ever read the trust document or
that he was aware of the specific property which was
transferred to the trust.
9. No additional documents have been prepared to
assign the seller's rights under the contract to the trust.
Max and Joyce were never notified that they should make
payments to the trust, and they have not been aware that the
creation of the trust affected their obligations under the
contract. With respect to the contract, after the trust was
created and signed, nothing further occurred which would have
formally notified Max and Joyce that the property had been
transferred to the trust.
10. When the parties dealt with the contract and
property after the contract date, they never referred to the
trust or purported to act as trustees. Based upon the record,
the Court concludes that the Buyers were never notified and
did not have actual notice that they were obligated to perform
their contract duties to the trust, therefore, the Buyers were
entitled to continue to deal with George and LaRue in their
individual capacities rather than in their capacities as
trustees of the trust.
As hereinafter set forth, the Court finds that the
contract was modified by the parties prior to the quitclaim
deed, therefore, to the extent that the trust is involved, the
Court concludes that the contract had been modified prior to
creation of the trust, and that each party is bound by the
modified agreement.
11. During the term of the agreement the parties
had several discussions concerning annual payments. The first
such discussion was prior to the creation of the trust and
prior to the date the first annual payment was due. This
discussion concerned whether or not the Buyers should make
annual payments. At that time and at all times thereafter,
whenever a payment was due, Max and Joyce either had the money
to make the annual payment or they had an ability to obtain
the money from their bank. When this matter was first
discussed in the spring of 1975, George told Max that he
should not make his payment but should invest his payment
monies to improve the property. George indicated that he did
not then need the money and that Max should continue to
improve the property. George indicated that he would notify
Max when he should begin making payments. There was no
discussion of forgiveness of any portion of the debt and no
discussion that payments were to be treated as gifts. Based
upon the contract and the discussion between the parties, the
Court concludes that there was, in fact, no forgiveness of any
portion of the debt at any time nor were the payments to be
treated as gifts.
George clearly indicated that Max and Joyce would
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not be expected to make their yearly payments. In reliance
upon this discussion, Max and Joyce invested their money by
improving the property rather than making their annual
payments. During the term of the agreement, these investments
took the form of purchasing and installing sprinkler pipes,
building numerous structures and outbuildings, building and
improving retention ponds, leveling and clearing land, the
construction of a home upon the property and in general,
improving the land. Based upon the evidence, the Court finds
that the improvements to the land which were made as a result
of not making payments are substantial and have resulted in a
substantial increase in the value of the land. Based upon the
evidence, the Court concludes that the contract was modified
by agreement between the parties so that contract payments
were delayed, but not forgiven.
12. In 1980 or 1981, Max and George again had a
conversation concerning payments, Jerry Carol was present
during this conversation. Again, payments were discussed.
Again, George instructed Max not to make payments to him but
to continue to invest the yearly installment payments into
improvements on the property.
13. In 1988 or 1989, the old home which had been
upon the property when it was purchased became unusable
because of a cracked foundation. It was, therefore, necessary
for Max and Joyce to either build, buy, or rent a home. Max
and Joyce could not then afford to make their yearly
installment payments, should they become due, and also build a
home. George was aware of Max and Joyce's financial
situation, and George instructed them to build a new home. As
a consequence, Max and Joyce built a new home and financed it
by pledging their cattle and equipment as security. If
forfeiture is ordered in this case, the Sellers would
therefore receive the new home free of any encumbrance while
the Buyers would continue to be liable for the mortgage which
is now approximately $30,000.
14. Nothing was said in any of the above
discussions about forgiving the yearly payments or treating
the yearly payments as gifts. As payments became due, Max and
Joyce relied upon the various statements of George and
invested their money in the property. If forfeiture is
ordered, the Sellers would not only receive the land, but they
would receive the value of the yearly payments which George
had instructed Max to invest in the property. It seems
extremely unjust to the Court to allow George to instruct the
Buyers not to make payments and then allow a forfeiture based
upon the reliance of the Buyers in not making payments.
15. On March 5th, 1993, a "notice of termination
of agreement" was sent to the Sellers by the Buyers. Prior to
that time, neither George nor LaRue had demanded that yearly
payments begin according to the written contract.

The Court relies upon the testimony of Max that hi
mother first asked for payments about a year after his father
died. George died April 18, 1992. Arguably, the request to
make payments could have occurred prior to the notice. The
Court believes that it did not. Nevertheless, even assuming
that LaRue requested payments prior to the notice, the yearly
payments were not due until May 1, 1993. Therefore, the
notice proceeded any default in payment.
16. The relationship between the various parties
is of considerable importance in resolving this case. The
parties to the contract are related by blood and/or marriage.
This accounts for the fact that records were not kept after
the contract was signed. Max and Joyce claim credit for
approximately $10,000 for materials and equipment which they
believe George picked up from the ranch over the contract
period. Max and Joyce also claim that the Sellers received
$24,980 from the sale of cattle which belonged to them
(Max and Joyce). Both parties claim that certain
conversations occurred. However, none of these conversations
or transactions were documented in writing.
George and LaRue were in disagreement with respect
to the payments. George had told Max that payments need not
be made. He indicated to LaRue and other family members thai:
he did not want to "get into it" with Max over the payments.
LaRue, on the other hand, always felt that Max and Joyce
should pay their payments in full. This was a frequent source
of disagreement between George and LaRue as can be seen from
the number of persons who overheard such discussions between
the couple.
Similarly, Joyce and Max were not of one mind about
how the payments were to be handled. Max told Joyce that his
father had told him to put payments into the property. She
wanted this put in writing and signed by George. However, her
husband told her that it would not be necessary to do so.
It is obvious that the failure of the parties to
handle this agreement in a formal business-like manner was due
to the relationship of the parties which relationship was
relied upon rather than creating a formal written
documentation. Indeed, the Court believes that the parties
each felt like it would have been an indication that they
didn't trust the other party if they would have required
written documentation.
17. In 1988 or 1989, Max and Joyce were
contemplating building a new home. Max testified that at that
time he knew he was still obligated to make payments under the
contract:. He testified that this was the reason for his
conversation with his dad, wherein his dad (George) indicated
that he should build the home rather than pay the payments.
If Max would have believed that his father had forgiven
payments he would have had no reason to be concerned about
5
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making payments at that time. At that time, no demand for
payments had been made. George had previously told his son
that he would ask for payments when he needed them.
Nevertheless, as an indication that Max knew he still owed the
payments, he contacted his father and obtained further
assurances that payments would not be required in view of his
need to build a home. Also, in 1979, Max maintains that he
sold some of his cattle and the proceeds went to George and
LaRue. This is a further indication that there was no
agreement to forgive debt or to treat payments as gifts. All
of this leads the Court to conclude that no agreement was ever
made nor did the seller or buyer ever agree to forgive debts
or to treat payments as gifts.
Buyers rely upon various statements of George that
payments need not be made as a basis for claiming that these
payments are not due. The evidence indicates that the
agreement between the parties in 1975, that is the oral
agreement, was merely to delay payments rather than to forgive
payments. Of course, this finding affects the defendant's
position on the statute of limitations. The statute does not
begin to run until a breach has occurred in the contract.
Here the parties had mutually agreed to delay payment until
the seller requested payment. No request was made until 1993.
Therefore, the statute did not begin to run until 1993. Under
the Court's finding of fact, no payments are affected by the
statute of limitations.
18. As stated earlier, the relationship between
the parties is important in considering this case. Not only
is the parent/sibbling relationship important but the
relationship between the spouses is also important.
George and LaRue: LaRue has testified that no
decisions were ever made without her input. She testified
that when making decisions, they (George and LaRue), always
made them together. While it may be true that they always
discussed these decisions, it is very clear to the Court that
if there was ever e disagreement, George's opinion
predominated. Geor 3 was strong willed and decisive. It was
George who ran and operated the dairy and the ranch. Prior to
selling the farm, George was the one who made the business
decisions which related to the farm.
The Court is convinced that the agreement and
modification were each negotiated entirely between George and
Max. Where there was disagreement, LaRue acquiesced to the
will of George. This is seen in their disagreement over the
payments. LaRue clearly wanted the payments to be made. She
discussed this subject often with George but could not get him
to take action. Instead of taking independent action, she
submitted to his will. She did not take any action prior to
his death and, indeed, not until March of 1993. Her
predisposition to submit to her husband's will was well known

to her children. Although her other children knew of her
feelings about the payments, they did not advise independent
action on her part to collect the debt. Instead, they worked
on their father to try to get him to change his mind. Within
the entire family, it was well known that at least with
respect to business decisions, George was calling the shots.
Finally, LaRue was aware that Max and others (including her
other children) believed that when George spoke in these
matters he spoke for her. She also certainly knew that
payments had not been made during the term of the contract.
Under these circumstances, the Court believes that Max
reasonably believed that when his father spoke he spoke for
both of his parents.
LaRue had allowed George to be spokesman. She knew
that others viewed George as their spokesman when it came to
business matters. And she allowed this to occur even when she
was in disagreement as to the decision which had been reached.
It is very apparent that George didn't want trouble between he
and his son, and LaRue didn't want trouble between her and her
husband. So she didn't take any action and neither did they.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that LaRue is
also bound by the representations of George with respect to
the payments. The Court also believes that LaRue knew that
George had authorized some kind of delay in the payments.
Max and Joyce: The relationship between Max and
Joyce was in all respects similar to the relationship of
George and LaRue. When there was a disagreement, Max's
opinion predominated, at least in business matters. Max ran
the farm and made the business decisions relating to the farm.
Joyce acquiesced when there was a conflict relating to the
farm. She was aware that Max and George had agreed to
postpone payments and wanted this in writing. Max disagreed,
believing that, between father and son, it was unnecessary to
memorialize an agreement in writing. Max's opinion always
predominated in these matters. Like LaRue, Joyce was aware
that when Max spoke he spoke for both of them. She was
certainly aware of all conversations between Max and George.
She knew that payments had been postponed and that monies had
been invested in the property. She did not believe that these
payments had been forgiven or gifted. Under these
circumstances, she is also bound by the agreement to postpone
payments.
19. In this matter there has been much testimony
about the desire and practice of George and LaRue to make
gifts to their children. It is clear that Max and Joyce
expected that they would receive gifts from their parents.
They did, in fact, receive payments of $12,500 from Linmar and
$30,000 from Mapco, for easements. Without deciding whether
these were gifts (as LaRue has testified), it is apparent that
under the circumstances of this case, it was necessary for the
7
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Sellers to agree that this money would go to the Buyers.
There was no record of the Buyers' interest in the property
filed with the county recorder's office. Under these
circumstances, Sellers certainly may have required that all or
a portion of the payments be applied against the contract
price. Nevertheless, as previously indicated, there is no
specific testimony that either George or LaRue ever indicated
that any of the payments would be gifts.
20. As previously stated, Max and Joyce continued
to believe that they were obligated under the contract. In
response to the notice which they received in 1993, they
caused their attorney to offer $57,100 as full payment under
the contract. In their calculations to reach the amount due,
they sought to offset the payments which they believed they
had made ($24,980 for cattle in 1979, $10,000 for equipment
and materials taken from the farm, and $8,280 for the down
payment) against the amount due and concluded that they owed
the sum of $57,100. While the calculation is clearly in
error, it is important that Max did not seek to offset any
gift against the principle amount due. He only sought to
deduct cash payments or payments made in kind. This is
another indication that Max did not believe that payments had
been forgiven or gifted. Although Max did try to treat the
interest which would have been due under the contract as a
gift. There is no basis to support treatment of interest as a
gift. Max and Joyce simply cannot take it upon themselves to
accept a gift that was never offered. Whether others may have
received gifts is simply not relevant to this inquiry except
that it shows that George and LaRue knew how to transfer
property by gift when that was their desire.
21. Max and Joyce claim that three payments were
made. The initial down payment, which the seller
acknowledges; payment for 26 head of cattle in 1979 of
$24,980, and 10,000 for equipment and material received in
kind. The evidence concerning the $10,000 was not convincing.
No evidence was produced as to what was taken, when it was
taken, or the value of anything that was taken. The Court
will, therefore, rule against the defendants as to the $10,000
payment in kind. The evidence on this sale of cattle is
conflicting. Exhibit D-7 indicates that cows were sold on
August 10th, 1979 and that they were George Fisher's cattle.
Max and Joyce did not record the sale of these cattle in the
livestock sold book (Exhibit 8) or in their income tax
returns. On the other hand, the cattle were reported under
cattle sales by George and LaRue (exhibit P-12).
Nevertheless, Max and Joyce have each testified that the 26
head of cattle were their cattle. They produced records,
Exhibit P-10, which indicates that they had purchased some 54
cows before the property was transferred in 1974. Max also
testified that he increased his herd through keeping his
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heifer calves. Unfortunately, no record exists as to the
exact number of cows each owned in May of 1974 when the ranch
was transferred. As between the two parties, the recollection
of LaRue is not as good as Max's. LaRue simply was not
involved in the daily operation of the dairy and did not have
a clear recollection concerning these issues. Based upon all
the evidence, the courts finds that the cattle which were sold
in 1979 were owned by Max and Joyce, therefore, the amount due
under the contract should be reduced by the amount of $24,980.
22. As previously indicated, based upon the
statement of George that payments would not be expected, a
home was built upon the property which is free of any
encumbrance to the land. Other buildings were built,
sprinkling systems were installed, the land was cleared and
graded, ponds were constructed and expanded, and the property
was improved. The Court finds that the property has been
substantially improved as a direct result of the monies which
would have otherwise been made toward the contracts being
invested in the property. The defendants relied upon the fact
that payments would not be required until they were requested
in their decision to invest payment monies into improvements.
The parties had agreed to defer payments. Therefore, the
defendants were not in default under the terms of the contract
as modified when notice was sent in March of 1993. Under
these circumstances, even if the contract was breached, it
would be inequitable for the Sellers to allow and encourage
payments to be invested in the property and then use the
failure to pay as a basis for breach of contract.
The parties never specifically addressed the issue
as to whether all payments would become due when George
requested payments to commence. In view of the fact that the
financial condition of Max and George would not have allowed
them to pay all of the accumulated payments at one time
(which George was aware o f ) , and in view of the fact that
George said that when he wanted payments he would ask for
them, the Court finds that the agreement between Max and
George to amend the contract did not contemplate that all
prior payments become due immediately upon the request of the
Sellers. It was contemplated and agreed that payments would
be delayed and commenced again when George requested them.
Plaintiff having failed on its complaint is not
entitled to attorney's fees. Defendant has not produced any
evidence as to attorney's fees or reserved the issue,
therefore, the defendants request for attorney's fees is also
denied.
23. Modification of this contract is not
prohibited under the statute of frauds. In this case the
modification did not concern any issue dealing with title to
the property. The modification came after buyer had entered
into possession and began to perform under the contract. The
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modification was limited to the timing of payments only. It
did not change the amount due. The contract was partially
performed, and the defendant relied upon the oral
representations. The improvements were substantial and
valuable. The decision to invest in the property rather than
make payments was exclusively referable to the oral
modification. The Court believes that the defendant changed
positions by performing on the oral modification so that it
would now be inequitable to permit the Seller to found their
claim for breach on the original agreement as unmodified. I
am particularly concerned about the home that was built, which
is free of encumbrance to the land but which has a mortgage
secured by equipment and cattle which is owned by Max and
Joyce. Even if there was a breach of contract in this case,
under the circumstances, it would be entirely inappropriate
and unequitable to allow the Sellers to forfeit the property.
Forfeiture is just not an appropriate remedy in this case.
24. Because of the conflicts which are very
apparent in this matter and also because of other conflicts
which have existed between Max and his mother and also Max and
his brother Brent, the Court believes that there has developed
deep seated feelings of animosity between the co-trustees. I
think that as is common with family situations where there is
a disagreement, there is also a feeling by the parties that
they have been betrayed by a loved one. In this case, these
feelings are so strong that it would be, in my judgment,
impossible for the parties to work together as co-trustees of
the trust. Perhaps over the long run, these wounds can heal.
But the business of running the trust requires immediate
cooperation between the trustees. These people cannot even
comfortably talk with one another, let alone work with one
another in dealing with problems which the trust will face. I
believe that these feelings are so strongly held that they
would invariably interfere with the duty which each has
towards the trust. In addition, Max is equivocable about his
interest in continuing as trustee. Under the circumstances of
this case, the Court believes that it would be appropriate to
remove Max as trustee, and the motion of the plaintiff with
respect to that matter is granted.
To sum up the Court's conclusions, the Court
concludes that the defendants were not in breach at the time
the notice of default was sent, that the purchasers owe the
entire sum under the contract plus interest less the down
payment and the amount received for cattle ($24,980). That
neither party is entitled to attorney's fees and that Max
should be replaced as trustee.
D ated
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FISHER FAMILY TRUST, OWNER
MAX & JOYCE FISHER, PURCHASER

May 1, 1993

192,809.00
% Rate: 5.000
Principal:
ANNUAL
Payment: 10,000 .00
FINAL
est. Payment: 11,545 .19

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035

. . .
.

.
.

.

Interest

Principal

9,640.45
9, 622.47
9, 603.60
9, 583.78
9, 562.96
9 541.11
9 518.17
9 494.08
9 468.78
9 442.22
9 414.33
9 385.05
9 ,354.30
9 r 322.02
9 r 288.12
9 r 252.52
9 ,215.15
9 ,175.91
9 ,134.70
9 091.44
9 ,046.01
8 ,998.31
8 ,948.22
8 ,895.64
8 ,840.42
8 r 782 .44
8 ,721.56
8 r 657.64
8 ,590.52
8 ,520.05
8 r 446.05
8 r 368.35
8 ,286.77
8 r 201.11
8 ,111.16
8 ,016.72
7 ,917.56
7 ,813.43
7 r 704.11
7 ,589.31
7 ,468.78
7 ,342.22

359.55
377.53
396.40
416.22
437.04
458.89
481.83
505.92
531.22
557.78
585.67
614.95
645.70
677.98
711.88
747.48
784.85
824.09
865.30
908.56
953.99
1,001.69
1,051.78
1,104.36
1,159.58
1,217.56
1,278.44
1,342.36
1,409.48
1,479.95
1,553.95
1,631.65
1,713.23
1,798.89
1,888.84
1,983 .28
2,082.44
2,186.57
2,295.89
2,410.69
2,531.22
2,657.78

Years: 68

IBalance
192, 449.45
192, 071.92
191, 675.52
191, 259.30
190, 822.26
190, 363 .37
189, 881.54
189, 375.62
188, 844.40
188, 286.62
187, 700.95
187, 086.00
186 440.30
185 762.32
185 050.44
184 302.96
183 518.11
182 694.02
181 828.72
180 920.16
179 966.17
178 964.48
177 912.70
176 808.34
175 648.76
174 431.20
173 152.76
171 810.40
170 400.92
168 920.97
167 367.02
165 735.37
164 022.14
162 223 .25
160 ,334.41
158 ,351.13
156 ,268.69
154 ,082.12
151 ,786.23
149 ,375.54
146 , 844.32
144 ,186.54

ADDENDUM - p. 12

FISHER FAMILY TRUST, OWNER
MAX & JOYCE FISHER, PURCHASER

Grand Totals

May 1, 1993

Interest

Principal

IBalance

7 209 .33
7 069 .79
6 923 .28
6 769 .45
6 607 92
6, 438 .32
6, 260 .23
6, 073 .24
5, 876 .91
5, 670 75
5, 454 29
5, 227 00
4, 988 35
4, 737 77
4, 474 66
4, 198 39
3, 908 .31
3, 603 73
3, 283 91
2, 948 11
2, 595 51
2, 225 29
1, 836 55
1, 428 38
999 80
549 79

2 ,790 .67
2 ,930 .21
3 , 076.72
3 r 230 .55
3 ,392 .08
3 ,561 .68
3 ,739 .77
3 ,926 .76
4 ,123 .09
4 r 329 .25
4 r 545 .71
4 , 773.00
5 r 011 .65
5 r 262 .23
5 r 525 .34
5 801 .61
6 , 091.69
6 r 396 .27
6 716 .09
7 r 051 .89
7 404 .49
7 774 .71
8 163 45
8 571 62
9 000 20
10, 995 81

141 395 .87

488, 736 60

192, 809 00

138
135
132
128
125
121
117
113
109

465 .66
388 .94
158 .39
766 .31
204 .63
464 .86
538 .10
415 .01
085 .76
104, 540 .05
99 161 .05
94, 755 .40
89, 493 .17
83, 967 .83
78, 166 22
72 074 .53
65, 678 26
58, 962 17
51, 910 28
44, 505 79
36, 731 08
28, 567 63
19, 996 01
10, 995 81
0 00

ADDENDUM - p. 13

GEORGE FISHER, JR. and LARUE FISHER, Sellers
MAX and JOYCE FISHER, Buyers
115,720.00 % Rate: 5.000
Principal
ANNUAL
Payment: 10,000.00
FINAL
est. Payment: 7,170.13

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

. . .

Grand Tc31c3tl5

May 1, 1974

Years: 18

Interest

Principal

Balance

5,786.00
5,575.30
5,354.06
5,121.77
4,877.86
4,621.75
4,352.84
4,070.48
3,774.00
3,462.70
3,135.84
2,792.63
2,432.26
2,053.87
1,656.57
1,239.40
801.37
341.44

4,214.00
4,424.70
4,645.94
4,878.23
5,122.14
5,378.25
5,647.16
5,929.52
6,226.00
6,537.30
6,864.16
7,207.37
7,567.74
7,946.13
8,343 .43
8,760.60
9,198.63
6,828.70

111,506.00
107,081.30
102,435.36
97,557.13
92,434.99
87,056.74
81,409.58
75,480.06
69,254.06
62,716.76
55,852.60
48,645.23
41,077.49
33,131.36
24,787.93
16,027.33
6,828.70
0.00

tl,450.14

115,720.00

ADDENDUM - p. 14

U.S. Consumer Price Index -- CPI-U
All Urban Consumers
1913-1993 Annual Averages

1913
1914

10.0
10.1

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944

1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

10.2
11.0
12.9
15.1
17.4

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949

18.0
19.5
22.3
24.1
23.8

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

53.8
56.9
60.6
65.2
72.6

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924

20.1
18.0
16.9
17.2
17.2

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

24.1
26.0
26.5
26.7
26.9

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

82.4
90.9
96.5
99.6
103.9

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

17.6
17.8
17.5
17.2
17.2

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

26.8
27.2
28.1
28.9
29.1

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

107.6
109.6
113.6
118.3
124.0

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934

16.8
15.3
13.7
13.0
13.5

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

29.6
29.9
30.2
30.6
31.0

1990
1991
1992

130.7
136.2
140.3

1993

(JPTp

1994

1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

13.7
13.9
14.4
14.1
13.9

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

31.5
32.4
33.4
34.8
36.7

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

(1982-1984 = 100)

14.0
14.7
16.3
17.3
17.6

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

38.8
40.5
41.8
44A

Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

